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(IV)

SPECIFIC CONTINGENCIES: US ACTION SEQUENCE

1. A US note to Cuba or the USSR which had the effect inter alia of warning them US military action was imminent might well result in either Cuba or the USSR (or both) calling on SC session to complain of imminent US plans of aggression before we had a chance to take any military steps.
2. On the assumption that action by the US was imminent, we should respond immediately with a counter-item and set in motion the OAS machinery under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty as well. NATO would also be informed and asked to cooperate.

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3. The counter-item should accuse the USSR of destroying Cuba's independence and of seeking now to use the SC as a smokescreen to camouflage its aggressive installation of weapons in Cuba, etc. It should assert our intention to exercise our rights of self-defense.
4. Our political program should not in these circumstances be put forward at the outset. The political program should be held until the point at which we act militarily. This presumably would come after a few meetings of the Council.
5. We should introduce at the outset of this sort of a situation a counter-resolution directed against the USSR.
6. At the end of the SC process we should ask for an Emergency

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GA ourselves.

7. (If action by us is not imminent, and knowledge of what has happened in Cuba not out, we could counter-attack the Soviet or Cuban item in the SC through speeches based on para. 3 above, without a counter-item.)

B. US Initiatives in Connection With Unilateral Military Action

1. Shortly before (several hours or somewhat less than a day ahead) US action the US should ask for an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the threat by the USSR's destruction of the independence of Cuba and its increased delivery of weapons and military personnel to Cuba, and possibly warning of the right of the American States to defend themselves. The request should

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- 4 -

should not mention the exact facts.

2. We should seek to have the meeting scheduled for shortly after the action -- e.g. if at night the next morning, otherwise on the same day.

3. Parallel with action in the SC we should convene the OAS on the same subject under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty. NATO would be asked to support one ~~the~~ OAS action.

4. At least the UK should be fully briefed in advance.

Probably also France.

5. In the SC meeting we should report under Article 51 what the USSR has done, and what we have done, and put

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put forth our political program. We may or may not want to put in a resolution at that point. (Although probably yes). But the resolution must be ready.

6. In the OAS we should ask for multilateral defensive military action under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty of the sort discussed above. (Although we have doubts whether we would get it in these circumstances.)

When action is taken the ~~R~~ OAS should report to the SC Under Article 51.

7. We should be prepared to go to the ~~EXX~~ GA under the Unity for Peace Procedure.

C. US Initiatives in Connection with Military Action through the OAS

1. Prior action through the OAS to get endorsement under

Article 6 of the Rio Treaty for military action (blockade

or airstrike)

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or airstrike) runs almost insurmountable risks of leaks. On a blockade this would not be disastrous; on the latter it might.

2. Our objective in this sequence would be to get an OAS decision which would immediately be reported by the OAS to the UN under Article 51.
3. The US should then at the same time submit a supplementary item charging the USSR with having destroyed Cuban political independence and using Cuba as a base of aggression in the hemisphere, etc. On the assumption that our military action in response to the OAS action is immediate the item would also report on action we are taking in consequence and under Article 51. In our speech but not in the item we would put forward our political program.

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- 7 -

4. NATO would presumably be convened at the same time as the OAS and asked to support OAS action.
5. The probability is that this sequence cannot be held because of leaks and that action would therefore be required in the SC before the OAS finishes its work.

In this case the US should proceed with an item in the Security Council before the OAS finishes its work.

(It is desirable that we go to the SC before the USSR.)

In our speech we should report on the urgent consultations in the OAS, bring out the facts ~~x~~ of the real situation in Cuba, and introduce a resolution calling on the USSR to dismantle the installations and abandon its efforts in the hemisphere. ~~MX~~ Hopefully we could put this to the vote immediately, and a Soviet veto would ~~FIXX~~

give

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- 8 -

give further justification for OAS action.

6. Another probability is that the USSR might call for an SC session itself immediately upon hearing of our convening of the OAS. If this happens we should respond with a counter-item on the above lines. (Our military action must come quickly in these circumstances -- paras. 5 and 6 -- as the danger of a cease-fire resolution being adopted will be severe, if not in the SC at least in the GA.)

7. The US political program would be introduced in the SC as a subsequent ~~xxx~~ step ~~xx~~ to the above to be ~~xxx~~ taken after OAS action and US implementation.

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D. US Initiatives Designed to Produce Political Solution
With Military Action Being Threatened in Connection

1. If we were asking for ~~XXXXXXXX~~ blockade rather than airstrike authority from OAS and wanted to try a big political solution before we actively carried out a blockade, we could follow still another course.

2. We could call for simultaneous meetings of the OAS, NATO and the SC. In the first two we would ask for Rio Treaty Article 6 action and support respectively. In the SC we would make the standard charge of Soviet destruction of Cuban independence, supply of arms (specifics) etc. We would announce we regard the situation as aggressive act and are seeking OAS and NATO action. At the same time we would make our

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- 10 -

political offer of ~~neutrality~~ neutralization, including a provision which would call for dismantling of the installations and no "hostile: moves on our part, with UN observers, etc.

3. The combination of steps would give us considerable bargaining power. The danger is, however, that the USSR would veto such a proposal and that a simple "cease-fire" would be proposed and carried, if not in the SC then in the GA, which would endeavor to stop a blockade without eliminating the installations. On the other hand the GA⁺ could also be expected to put mediatory efforts into active play, with results which would probably be beneficial.

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EXCISE

(IV)

UN ASPECTS OF CUBAN SITUATION

SPECIFIC CONTINGENCIES: US ACTION SEQUENCE

A. Soviet Initiative in SC (as Result of US Note)

1. A US note to Cuba or the USSR which had the effect
inter alia of warning them US military action was
imminent might well result in either Cuba or the
USSR (or both) calling on SC session to complain of
imminent US plans of aggression before we had a chance
to take any military steps.
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we should respond immediately with a counter-item and
set in motion the OAS machinery under Article 6 of the
Rio Treaty as well. NATO would also be informed and
asked to cooperate.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDG/MR

REVIEWED BY *RBH*

() RECLASSIFY

(X) EXCISE

() DENY

FOI, EO or PA exemptions

() CLASSIFY as

(X) DOWNGRADE TS to () S or (X) C, OADR

DATE

2/10/88

() DECLASSIFY

(X) DECLASSIFY in PART

() Non-responsive info.

(X) TS authority to:

OADR

(X) C, OADR

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3. The counter-item should accuse the USSR of destroying Cuba's independence and of seeking now to use the SC as a smokescreen to camouflage its aggressive installation of weapons in Cuba, etc. It should assert our intention to exercise our rights of self-defense.
4. Our political program should not in these circumstances be put forward at the outset. The political program should be held until the point at which we act militarily. This presumably would come after a few meetings of the Council.
5. We should introduce at the outset of this sort of a situation a counter-resolution directed against the USSR.
6. At the end of the SC process we should ask for an Emergency

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GA ourselves.

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OAS on the same subject under Article 6 of the Rio

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or airstrike) runs almost insurmountable risks of leaks. On a blockade this would not be disastrous; on the latter it might.

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(It is desirable that we go to the SC before the USSR.)

In our speech we should report on the urgent consultations in the OAS, bring out the facts of the real situation in Cuba, and introduce a resolution calling on the USSR to dismantle the installations and abandon its efforts in the hemisphere. ~~XX~~ Hopefully we could put this to the vote immediately, and a Soviet veto would ~~give~~

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give further justification for OAS action.

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